Binance bitcoin hack: Over $40 million of cryptocurrency ...

I bought my 1st Bitcoin, now what?

HELLO BIITCONNEEEECT! (if you know you know)
I just bought my first bitcoin and I'm pretty happy with the outcome so far. I signed up for Binance and downloaded Exodus (cryptowallet).
Ideally I'd like to now move on with my life.
However, I've been told to send all my bitcoin into a wallet of my own, instead of leaving it in Binance's wallet. I'm not sure why, I'm assuming it's due to security concerns?
Anyway, I'm curious as to how do I send my bitcoin from Binance to my wallet?
Furthermore, what if my computer gets stolen or damaged? Can I still access my Exodus?
I tried searching Google before I came to you guys, but all the info is too much for me and I'm too old to get into this stuff, I just wanted to invest a bit given the following news:
"BANK OF ENGLAND IS SAID TO BE CONSIDERING A CONTROVERSIAL MOVE INTO NEGATIVE INTEREST RATES - THE TELEGRAPH"
Many thanks, everyone.
submitted by bigpappabelly to BitcoinBeginners [link] [comments]

Bob The Magic Custodian



Summary: Everyone knows that when you give your assets to someone else, they always keep them safe. If this is true for individuals, it is certainly true for businesses.
Custodians always tell the truth and manage funds properly. They won't have any interest in taking the assets as an exchange operator would. Auditors tell the truth and can't be misled. That's because organizations that are regulated are incapable of lying and don't make mistakes.

First, some background. Here is a summary of how custodians make us more secure:

Previously, we might give Alice our crypto assets to hold. There were risks:

But "no worries", Alice has a custodian named Bob. Bob is dressed in a nice suit. He knows some politicians. And he drives a Porsche. "So you have nothing to worry about!". And look at all the benefits we get:
See - all problems are solved! All we have to worry about now is:
It's pretty simple. Before we had to trust Alice. Now we only have to trust Alice, Bob, and all the ways in which they communicate. Just think of how much more secure we are!

"On top of that", Bob assures us, "we're using a special wallet structure". Bob shows Alice a diagram. "We've broken the balance up and store it in lots of smaller wallets. That way", he assures her, "a thief can't take it all at once". And he points to a historic case where a large sum was taken "because it was stored in a single wallet... how stupid".
"Very early on, we used to have all the crypto in one wallet", he said, "and then one Christmas a hacker came and took it all. We call him the Grinch. Now we individually wrap each crypto and stick it under a binary search tree. The Grinch has never been back since."

"As well", Bob continues, "even if someone were to get in, we've got insurance. It covers all thefts and even coercion, collusion, and misplaced keys - only subject to the policy terms and conditions." And with that, he pulls out a phone-book sized contract and slams it on the desk with a thud. "Yep", he continues, "we're paying top dollar for one of the best policies in the country!"
"Can I read it?' Alice asks. "Sure," Bob says, "just as soon as our legal team is done with it. They're almost through the first chapter." He pauses, then continues. "And can you believe that sales guy Mike? He has the same year Porsche as me. I mean, what are the odds?"

"Do you use multi-sig?", Alice asks. "Absolutely!" Bob replies. "All our engineers are fully trained in multi-sig. Whenever we want to set up a new wallet, we generate 2 separate keys in an air-gapped process and store them in this proprietary system here. Look, it even requires the biometric signature from one of our team members to initiate any withdrawal." He demonstrates by pressing his thumb into the display. "We use a third-party cloud validation API to match the thumbprint and authorize each withdrawal. The keys are also backed up daily to an off-site third-party."
"Wow that's really impressive," Alice says, "but what if we need access for a withdrawal outside of office hours?" "Well that's no issue", Bob says, "just send us an email, call, or text message and we always have someone on staff to help out. Just another part of our strong commitment to all our customers!"

"What about Proof of Reserve?", Alice asks. "Of course", Bob replies, "though rather than publish any blockchain addresses or signed transaction, for privacy we just do a SHA256 refactoring of the inverse hash modulus for each UTXO nonce and combine the smart contract coefficient consensus in our hyperledger lightning node. But it's really simple to use." He pushes a button and a large green checkmark appears on a screen. "See - the algorithm ran through and reserves are proven."
"Wow", Alice says, "you really know your stuff! And that is easy to use! What about fiat balances?" "Yeah, we have an auditor too", Bob replies, "Been using him for a long time so we have quite a strong relationship going! We have special books we give him every year and he's very efficient! Checks the fiat, crypto, and everything all at once!"

"We used to have a nice offline multi-sig setup we've been using without issue for the past 5 years, but I think we'll move all our funds over to your facility," Alice says. "Awesome", Bob replies, "Thanks so much! This is perfect timing too - my Porsche got a dent on it this morning. We have the paperwork right over here." "Great!", Alice replies.
And with that, Alice gets out her pen and Bob gets the contract. "Don't worry", he says, "you can take your crypto-assets back anytime you like - just subject to our cancellation policy. Our annual management fees are also super low and we don't adjust them often".

How many holes have to exist for your funds to get stolen?
Just one.

Why are we taking a powerful offline multi-sig setup, widely used globally in hundreds of different/lacking regulatory environments with 0 breaches to date, and circumventing it by a demonstrably weak third party layer? And paying a great expense to do so?
If you go through the list of breaches in the past 2 years to highly credible organizations, you go through the list of major corporate frauds (only the ones we know about), you go through the list of all the times platforms have lost funds, you go through the list of times and ways that people have lost their crypto from identity theft, hot wallet exploits, extortion, etc... and then you go through this custodian with a fine-tooth comb and truly believe they have value to add far beyond what you could, sticking your funds in a wallet (or set of wallets) they control exclusively is the absolute worst possible way to take advantage of that security.

The best way to add security for crypto-assets is to make a stronger multi-sig. With one custodian, what you are doing is giving them your cryptocurrency and hoping they're honest, competent, and flawlessly secure. It's no different than storing it on a really secure exchange. Maybe the insurance will cover you. Didn't work for Bitpay in 2015. Didn't work for Yapizon in 2017. Insurance has never paid a claim in the entire history of cryptocurrency. But maybe you'll get lucky. Maybe your exact scenario will buck the trend and be what they're willing to cover. After the large deductible and hopefully without a long and expensive court battle.

And you want to advertise this increase in risk, the lapse of judgement, an accident waiting to happen, as though it's some kind of benefit to customers ("Free institutional-grade storage for your digital assets.")? And then some people are writing to the OSC that custodians should be mandatory for all funds on every exchange platform? That this somehow will make Canadians as a whole more secure or better protected compared with standard air-gapped multi-sig? On what planet?

Most of the problems in Canada stemmed from one thing - a lack of transparency. If Canadians had known what a joke Quadriga was - it wouldn't have grown to lose $400m from hard-working Canadians from coast to coast to coast. And Gerald Cotten would be in jail, not wherever he is now (at best, rotting peacefully). EZ-BTC and mister Dave Smilie would have been a tiny little scam to his friends, not a multi-million dollar fraud. Einstein would have got their act together or been shut down BEFORE losing millions and millions more in people's funds generously donated to criminals. MapleChange wouldn't have even been a thing. And maybe we'd know a little more about CoinTradeNewNote - like how much was lost in there. Almost all of the major losses with cryptocurrency exchanges involve deception with unbacked funds.
So it's great to see transparency reports from BitBuy and ShakePay where someone independently verified the backing. The only thing we don't have is:
It's not complicated to validate cryptocurrency assets. They need to exist, they need to be spendable, and they need to cover the total balances. There are plenty of credible people and firms across the country that have the capacity to reasonably perform this validation. Having more frequent checks by different, independent, parties who publish transparent reports is far more valuable than an annual check by a single "more credible/official" party who does the exact same basic checks and may or may not publish anything. Here's an example set of requirements that could be mandated:
There are ways to structure audits such that neither crypto assets nor customer information are ever put at risk, and both can still be properly validated and publicly verifiable. There are also ways to structure audits such that they are completely reasonable for small platforms and don't inhibit innovation in any way. By making the process as reasonable as possible, we can completely eliminate any reason/excuse that an honest platform would have for not being audited. That is arguable far more important than any incremental improvement we might get from mandating "the best of the best" accountants. Right now we have nothing mandated and tons of Canadians using offshore exchanges with no oversight whatsoever.

Transparency does not prove crypto assets are safe. CoinTradeNewNote, Flexcoin ($600k), and Canadian Bitcoins ($100k) are examples where crypto-assets were breached from platforms in Canada. All of them were online wallets and used no multi-sig as far as any records show. This is consistent with what we see globally - air-gapped multi-sig wallets have an impeccable record, while other schemes tend to suffer breach after breach. We don't actually know how much CoinTrader lost because there was no visibility. Rather than publishing details of what happened, the co-founder of CoinTrader silently moved on to found another platform - the "most trusted way to buy and sell crypto" - a site that has no information whatsoever (that I could find) on the storage practices and a FAQ advising that “[t]rading cryptocurrency is completely safe” and that having your own wallet is “entirely up to you! You can certainly keep cryptocurrency, or fiat, or both, on the app.” Doesn't sound like much was learned here, which is really sad to see.
It's not that complicated or unreasonable to set up a proper hardware wallet. Multi-sig can be learned in a single course. Something the equivalent complexity of a driver's license test could prevent all the cold storage exploits we've seen to date - even globally. Platform operators have a key advantage in detecting and preventing fraud - they know their customers far better than any custodian ever would. The best job that custodians can do is to find high integrity individuals and train them to form even better wallet signatories. Rather than mandating that all platforms expose themselves to arbitrary third party risks, regulations should center around ensuring that all signatories are background-checked, properly trained, and using proper procedures. We also need to make sure that signatories are empowered with rights and responsibilities to reject and report fraud. They need to know that they can safely challenge and delay a transaction - even if it turns out they made a mistake. We need to have an environment where mistakes are brought to the surface and dealt with. Not one where firms and people feel the need to hide what happened. In addition to a knowledge-based test, an auditor can privately interview each signatory to make sure they're not in coercive situations, and we should make sure they can freely and anonymously report any issues without threat of retaliation.
A proper multi-sig has each signature held by a separate person and is governed by policies and mutual decisions instead of a hierarchy. It includes at least one redundant signature. For best results, 3of4, 3of5, 3of6, 4of5, 4of6, 4of7, 5of6, or 5of7.

History has demonstrated over and over again the risk of hot wallets even to highly credible organizations. Nonetheless, many platforms have hot wallets for convenience. While such losses are generally compensated by platforms without issue (for example Poloniex, Bitstamp, Bitfinex, Gatecoin, Coincheck, Bithumb, Zaif, CoinBene, Binance, Bitrue, Bitpoint, Upbit, VinDAX, and now KuCoin), the public tends to focus more on cases that didn't end well. Regardless of what systems are employed, there is always some level of risk. For that reason, most members of the public would prefer to see third party insurance.
Rather than trying to convince third party profit-seekers to provide comprehensive insurance and then relying on an expensive and slow legal system to enforce against whatever legal loopholes they manage to find each and every time something goes wrong, insurance could be run through multiple exchange operators and regulators, with the shared interest of having a reputable industry, keeping costs down, and taking care of Canadians. For example, a 4 of 7 multi-sig insurance fund held between 5 independent exchange operators and 2 regulatory bodies. All Canadian exchanges could pay premiums at a set rate based on their needed coverage, with a higher price paid for hot wallet coverage (anything not an air-gapped multi-sig cold wallet). Such a model would be much cheaper to manage, offer better coverage, and be much more reliable to payout when needed. The kind of coverage you could have under this model is unheard of. You could even create something like the CDIC to protect Canadians who get their trading accounts hacked if they can sufficiently prove the loss is legitimate. In cases of fraud, gross negligence, or insolvency, the fund can be used to pay affected users directly (utilizing the last transparent balance report in the worst case), something which private insurance would never touch. While it's recommended to have official policies for coverage, a model where members vote would fully cover edge cases. (Could be similar to the Supreme Court where justices vote based on case law.)
Such a model could fully protect all Canadians across all platforms. You can have a fiat coverage governed by legal agreements, and crypto-asset coverage governed by both multi-sig and legal agreements. It could be practical, affordable, and inclusive.

Now, we are at a crossroads. We can happily give up our freedom, our innovation, and our money. We can pay hefty expenses to auditors, lawyers, and regulators year after year (and make no mistake - this cost will grow to many millions or even billions as the industry grows - and it will be borne by all Canadians on every platform because platforms are not going to eat up these costs at a loss). We can make it nearly impossible for any new platform to enter the marketplace, forcing Canadians to use the same stagnant platforms year after year. We can centralize and consolidate the entire industry into 2 or 3 big players and have everyone else fail (possibly to heavy losses of users of those platforms). And when a flawed security model doesn't work and gets breached, we can make it even more complicated with even more people in suits making big money doing the job that blockchain was supposed to do in the first place. We can build a system which is so intertwined and dependent on big government, traditional finance, and central bankers that it's future depends entirely on that of the fiat system, of fractional banking, and of government bail-outs. If we choose this path, as history has shown us over and over again, we can not go back, save for revolution. Our children and grandchildren will still be paying the consequences of what we decided today.
Or, we can find solutions that work. We can maintain an open and innovative environment while making the adjustments we need to make to fully protect Canadian investors and cryptocurrency users, giving easy and affordable access to cryptocurrency for all Canadians on the platform of their choice, and creating an environment in which entrepreneurs and problem solvers can bring those solutions forward easily. None of the above precludes innovation in any way, or adds any unreasonable cost - and these three policies would demonstrably eliminate or resolve all 109 historic cases as studied here - that's every single case researched so far going back to 2011. It includes every loss that was studied so far not just in Canada but globally as well.
Unfortunately, finding answers is the least challenging part. Far more challenging is to get platform operators and regulators to agree on anything. My last post got no response whatsoever, and while the OSC has told me they're happy for industry feedback, I believe my opinion alone is fairly meaningless. This takes the whole community working together to solve. So please let me know your thoughts. Please take the time to upvote and share this with people. Please - let's get this solved and not leave it up to other people to do.

Facts/background/sources (skip if you like):



Thoughts?
submitted by azoundria2 to QuadrigaInitiative [link] [comments]

How DAO users can truly control their voting rights

How DAO users can truly control their voting rights
https://blockchaintopbuzz.medium.com/how-dao-users-can-truly-control-their-voting-rights-f945c9c6b65e
Aelf proposed a solution that gives the control of the voting rights back to users by classifying token permissions.
As of today, there are still few complete businesses. In addition to mining and building trading platforms, it is difficult to create a complete business model. Moreover, various trading platforms have gradually grown into enterprises with comprehensive products in the blockchain industry, including wallets, nodes, lending, mining pools, etc.
At the same time, cloud services can reduce the cost of building small exchanges, but they can also lead to big trading platforms monopolizing data. For example, some Internet companies provide free cloud services in order to collect more valuable data.
Currently, Ethereum, which has the richest DeFi ecosystem, is gradually upgrading to V2.0, and its consensus protocol will also be upgraded to PoS. Governance voting can be regarded as the most important feature in the PoS ecosystem.
This year, Yearn.Finance rose to sudden prominence. But due to the governance problem, its community members initiated a hard fork, resulting in YFII. Another DeFi project, YAM, had a unfixable rebase function error. The founding team apologized for the error and announced a ‘Migration Plan’, which will turn the project over to the community.
For a while, governance voting became all the rage. However, the increasingly bigger trading platforms have been criticized by users in governance voting. Is there a proper solution to handling the relationship between the trading platform and governance voting?

What will we lose when trading platforms monopolize the blockchain industry?

In June 2018, during the BP node election before the EOS mainnet launch, node voting began to have a crisis of confidence between token holders and the trading platform. it is widely believed that the top 20 holders of trading platform wallets held about 40% of all the EOS in circulation.
Since then, many trading platforms have enabled the “User Authorization” interface. EOS holders can authorize the token voting rights to the trading platform, who will vote on behalf of the users. The rule caused a backlash from users, forcing these trading platforms to change the rule immediately so that EOS holders could vote on their preferred BP nodes.
After the EOS BP node votes, whether the trading platform has the token voting right has been occasionally discussed, but fewhave noticed it.
Two years later, Justin Sun, founder of TRON, made a commercial acquisition of Steemit, a decentralized social networking platform. After the acquisition was announced, the Steemit community launched a soft fork to resist the project being controlled by TRON. However, Justin Sun voted with the support of trading platforms such as Binance, Huobi and Poloniex to prevent a soft fork.
After being questioned by users, Binance and Huobi said that they would no longer interfere in the voting of the Steemit community. However, hkdev 404 of the Steem community again reveived votes from Huobi accounts. It is said that nearly 40 million votes were cast during the incident, accounting for about 10% of the total circulation of STEEM tokens.
There is no doubt that when the trading platform monopolizes the industry, we will lose our voting right.
How do we defend our voting rights
The fact that the ownership of the tokens belongs to the holders is indisputable, but what about the voting rights of the tokens deposited on the trading platform? How can we defend our voting rights after trading platforms have monopolized the industry?

Trading Platform Model

Traditional centralized trading platforms will assign to each user a separate deposit address. After depositing, the depositedamount will be added into the cold wallet and hot wallet. When users want to withdraw their tokens, the trading platform will transfer the tokens out of the hot wallet. If there is insufficient balance in the hot wallet, then the tokens will be transferred from the cold wallet to the hot wallet, and then be withdrawn.
Under the traditional centralized trading platform model, once users transfer their tokens into a trading platform, it means thetoken ownership (including voting rights) is also transferred to that trading platform.
The aelf solution: classify token permissions and claim back voting rights
For the issue of “voting rights” between token holders and centralized trading platforms, aelf, a decentralized cloud computing blockchain network, has proposed a solution: to establish an aelf Centre Asset Management Contract on the chain. The contract can limit the funds entering the exchange and define different permissions to control the assets.
The main feature of the aelf Centre Asset Management Contract is to create the “Main Virtual Address of the Trading Platform”.
Each exchange has a main virtual address, which can only be used for transfer operation, but not for voting, trading and other operations. As a result, the exchange cannot misappropriate users’ assets for voting. At the same time, the assets of the primary virtual address are publicly available on the chain, which makes it more difficult for the exchange to misappropriate assets.
At the same time, the aelf Centre Asset Management Contract also has the function of “address definition”. The exchange can open different permissions to different addresses, such as opening different permissions according to the amount, transactions exceeding a certain amount can only be given the greenlight by using multiple signatures, and the assets can be frozen through the contract when the assets of the trading platform are stolen, etc.
For the users of the trading platform, the access of the trading platform to the aelf Center Asset Management Contract function will not undermine user experience. The virtual system address of the aelf Center Asset Management Contract will assign a virtual address to each user, which offers the same user experience as the traditional mode.
For the trading platform, each deposit address constructed by the virtual address system is generated by the algorithm and does not need to be carried out on the blockchain. This means that the trading platform does not need to manage a large number of private keys, and there is no risk that the private keys will be lost.
On the most important “voting rights” issue, the aelf Center Asset Management Contract will assign to each user a separate virtual address for voting:
Voting address = Hash (Exchange Main Address + Token + “VOTE”)
Voting process: the tokens are transferred from the main virtual address of the exchange to the special “voting address” for voting, and are then voted. After voting, the tokens are withdrawn from the voting address back to the main virtual address.
We can see that the aelf Centre Asset Management Contract proposed by aelf can improve the efficiency of the trading platform without affecting user experience. In addition, it solves the problem that users would lose their voting rights.
According to the data on Crypto Mode, the market value of PoS tokens has exceeded $33 billion without counting Ethereum. In the field of crypto, it is the biggest ecosystem next to Bitcoin. The most important function of PoS is vote staking. faced with bigtrading platforms, if the status quo continues, retail investors will gradually lose their “voting rights” that belong to them.

Comparison of Market Value of PoS tokens (Source: Crypto Mode)
The emergence of DAO offers an alternative to trading platforms who misappropriate users’ tokens, but it still can not change this situation. Of course, DAO will not die out. Small communities will still use DAO for community governance. The idea behind the design of aelf is to start from the underlying trading platform and solve this issue at the source. Whether the solution can work still takes time. However, as a member of the crypto industry, we should understand the importance of “voting rights”, and cannot allow the exchange to seize our rights at will.
Recently, aelf has also announced its DeFi plan, which includes a new blockchain 3.0 project with a large number of new technical features, such as cross chain function, virtual address and cloud services. Aelf also proposed a set of interoperability solutions with ERC-20 tokens. It can directly access the ETH ecosystem, allow ETH-based applications and wallets to directly access it, and maintain the interoperability with ETH. And aelf will provide a high-performance smart contract operation platform and cloud services that can support cross chain interaction. Users on major cloud servers can easily run aelf’s services and adjust the scale of cloud according to their own business needs.
The implementation of a slew of tools, cloud services and interoperability solutions developed by aelf means that centralized transactions can be directly connected to the aelf network, realizing one-click adaptation to the DeFi ecosystem. With aelf, CeFi and DeFi are able to learn from and complement each other.
submitted by Floris-Jan to aelfofficial [link] [comments]

How to purchase and exchange your litecoin! (longer read)

This post will show you the best ways to buy litecoins using many different payment methods and exchanges for each method.
Before you start, make sure you have a good litecoin wallet to store your LTC. NEVER store your litecoins on a crypto exchange.

Popular Exchanges

eToro
Coinbase
Coinmama

Buy Litecoin with Credit Card or Debit Card

Let’s dive into some of the exchanges supporting Litecoin credit card purchases.
These exchanges are our favorite ways to buy.

Coinbase

Coinbase is the easiest way to buy litecoins with a credit card.
Coinbase is available in the United States, Canada, Europe, UK, Singapore, and Australia.
The fees will come out to 3.99% per purchase.
Here is a good video that can help walk you through the process of buying on Coinbase, although it’s fairly easy.

Coinmama

Coinmama recently added the ability to buy litecoin directly on the platform. Users from nearly any country in the world can use Coinmama to buy litecoins.
Coinmama has some of the highest limits among credit card exchanges.

BitPanda

BitPanda is based in Austria and is a crypto brokerage service. You can buy using a credit card from most European countries.

CEX.io

CEX.io is based in the UK and is one of the oldest crypto exchanges online.
CEX.io supports litecoin and its users from nearly anywhere in the world can buy litecoin with credit card on the platform.

Buy Litecoin with Bank Account or Bank Transfer

Coinbase

Coinbase is the easiest way to buy litecoins with a bank account or transfer.
Coinbase, like is is for credit cards, is available in the United States, Canada, Europe, UK, Singapore, and Australia.
Coinbase is one of primary exchanges used to buy Litecoins.
Americans can use ACH transfer (5–7 days wait), and Europeans can use SEPA transfer (1–3 days wait).
The fees will come out to 1.49% per purchase.

BitPanda

BitPanda is based in Austria and is a crypto brokerage service. You can buy using SEPA transfer from most European countries. You can also use SOFORT, NETELLER, or GiroPay.

CEX.io

CEX.io also supports litecoin buys via bank account. This is via wire transfer for US citizens, SEPA for Europe, and SWIFT for the rest of the globe.

Binance

Binance is now one of the largest if not the largest cryptocurrency exchange in the world. It supports bank and card purchases of Litecoin as well as Litecoin trading pairs with Bitcoin and Etehreum.

Get a Litecoin Wallet

Before we move onto other options:
Never store your litecoins on an exchange!
Always withdrawal your litecoin to an offline cryptocurrency wallet like the Ledger Nano S or any other wallet that you control.
The Ledger Nano S and TREZOR are the best options for secure storage.

Other Methods to Buy Litecoin

If you don’t have a card or want to avoid the high fees, you can use the following methods to buy Litecoin as well.
Find out which one works best for you.

Buy Litecoin with PayPal

Unfortunately, there is no easy way to buy Litecoin with PayPal. Other sites will tell you that cex allows for this, but that is no longer the case.
You can, however, now use eToro to buy Litecoin, unless you live in the United States.
If you live in the US, the only way to buy Litecoin with Paypal is to buy Bitcoin using paypal, and then use the Bitcoins to buy Litecoin. You can easily buy Bitcoin using Paypal on Local Bitcoins. Once you have Bitcoin, you can use an exchange like Coinbase Pro to swap the Bitcoin for Litecoin.

Buy Litecoin with Cash

There is no good way to buy litecoins with cash. LocalBitcoins is the most popular way to buy bitcoins with cash, and it does not have Litecoin support. Other popular cash to Bitcoin exchanges like BitQuick and Wall of Coins also do not support LTC. So you will have to first buy bitcoins with cash then exchange them for LTC using the method described below.
The same goes for Bitcoin ATMs. Most do not support Litecoin. So if you want to buy litecoins at a Bitcoin ATM you first have to buy bitcoins and then trade the BTC for litecoins.

Buy Litecoin with Bitcoin

If you already have Bitcoins then it is VERY simple to convert some of your BTC to litecoins.
You just need to find an exchange with the LTC/BTC pair, which is most exchanges since LTC/BTC is a very popular pair to trade.

Buy Litecoin with Skrill

BitPanda, mentioned above, also accepts Skrill payments for LTC. The fees will vary and are simply included in your buy price.

Cryptmixer

Cryptmixer is probably the fastest way to convert BTC to Litecoin. You just enter the amount of LTC you want to buy, and give them a LTC address. Then they will tell you how much BTC to send to their address. Once your BTC is sent, you will have LTC delivered to your wallet very shortly after.

Buy Litecoin with Ethereum

Ethereum has experienced a massive price rise. Nearly a year ago it was $10, and now at over $500, many want to move some of their ETH gains into other coins like Litecoin.
Litecoin has very good liquidity, and is very popular among traders especially in China.
So this guide is going to show you how to buy litecoins with Ethereum. We will show some of the best exchanges you can use, and the pros and cons of using different types of exchanges over the other.

Cryptmixer

Cryptmixer is one of the most unique exchanges, and also one of the fastest ways to convert your ETH to LTC.
With Cryptmixer you do not even need to store your money with the exchange, meaning you are at very little risk of getting your funds stolen.
With Cryptmixer you simply specify the amount of LTC you want to buy, and specific the address to where your litecoins should be sent and within 30 minutes you will have LTC delivered to your wallet.

Poloniex

Poloniex is the world’s largest altcoin exchange. However, there is a huge downside to using Poloniex to convert your ETH to LTC:
Poloniex does not have a LTC/ETH market, meaning you have to first trade your ETH to BTC, and then trade your BTC for LTC.
While this method works, you will have to make multiple trades and also pay fees twice.

ShapeShift

Shapeshift is basically the same as Cryptmixer, and was actually the first company to come up with the concept of an exchange that does not hold your own funds.

Frequently Asked Questions About Buying Litecoin

Many of you may still have lots of questions about how to buy Litecoin.
Odds are we have answered almost any question you could think of below.
We will aim to answer many of the most common questions relating to buying Litecoin.

Why are there limited options to buying Litecoin using other altcoins?

The issue in all crypto markets is liquidity. As the space gets bigger, the liquidity also gets better. But as of now, the only VERY liquid cryptocurrency is Bitcoin. So exchanging two altcoins between each other is often harder than if BTC was involved on one side of the trade.

How much is a Litecoin worth?

Like all currencies, the value of Litecoin changes every second. The value of Litecoin also depends on the country you are in and the exchange you are trading on. You can find the most up to date price on Coinbase.

How do I buy Ripple (XRP) with Litecoin?

The best way to buy Ripple using Litecoin is to either use a non KYC exchange like Cryptmixer or start an account on Binance or Coinbase Pro and sell your Litecoin for Ripple. Look for LTC/XRP trading pairs, and make your trade.

How long does Litecoin take to confirm?

Litecoin blocks are added ever 2 and a half minutes. That means you should get one confirmation every two and a half minutes. This can vary if it takes miners longer to discover a block, but the difficulty of the finding a block should change proportionate to the hashing power on the network so that a block gets added approximately every 2.5 minutes.
If you are trying to send money to a merchant, they may require more than one confirmation before they send you products. If you are depositing on an exchange, they may also require three or more confirmations before they credit your account.

How many Litoshis make one Litecoin?

one hundred million (100,000,000) Litoshis make one (1) Litecoin.

Where do I store Litecoin?

The best place to store litecoin is on a hardware wallet. You can find the best one for you on our page dedicated to hardware wallets.

When is the Litecoin halving?

The expected date of the next Litecoin block reward halving is August 7th, 2023.

Why can litecoin take so long to buy?

Litecoin can take long to buy because the legacy banking system is very slow. If you are buying with another cryptocurrency, you will see how fast it is to buy!
Bank transfer in the USA, for example, take about 5 days to complete. So any purchase of Litecoin made with a US bank transfer will take a minimum of 5 days.

How do I buy Litecoin with Paypal?

Unfortunately, there is no easy way to buy Litcoin with PayPal. Other sites will tell you that cex allows for this, but that is no longer the case.
You can, however, now use eToro to buy Litcoineum, unless you live in the United States.
If you live in the US, the only way to buy Litcoin with Paypal is to buy Bitcoin using paypal, and then use the Bitcoins to buy Litcoin. You can easily buy Bitcoin using Paypal on Local Bitcoins. Once you have Bitcoin, you can use an exchange like Cryptmixer to swap the Bitcoin for Litcoin.

Can you buy partial litecoins?

Yes, litecoin, like Bitcoin, is divisible to many decimal places so you can buy 0.1 LTC, 0.001 LTC, etc.

Can you sell litecoin?

Yes, you can sell LTC on most of the exchanges mentioned above. The fees, speed, and privacy is the same in most cases.

Can anyone buy litecoins?

Anyone is free to buy litecoins, as long as you find an exchange that supports your country. Most cryptocurrency wallets do not require ID to sign up so you can always make a wallet and get paid in litecoin, too.

Which payment method is best to use?

For speed, credit card will likely be fastest. For larger amounts, bank transfer is best. For privacy, it’s best to buy bitcoins with cash and then trade for litecoins using Cryptmixer or Shapeshift.

Is it better to mine or buy litecoins?

If you have cheap electricity, it might be worth it to mine litecoins. If you have solar power or just want to mine for fun then it could be worth it. Otherwise, it’s probably better just to buy.
Mining is constantly changing and small changes in Litecoin price or electricity can greatly affect your profitability.

What should I do with my litecoins once I buy?

You should immediately move your litecoins into a secure wallet. You should never leave your litecoins on an exchange. There have been countless hacks in cryptocurrency since Bitcoin was created in 2009. Hundreds of thousands of people have lost money. So buy your litecoins, and then instantly send them into a wallet you control so you are not at risk of losing money to a hack or scam.
submitted by MonishaNuij to MonMonCrypto [link] [comments]

Where's My Money? Deposits And Withdrawals At Blockfi, Celsius, Crypto.Com And Nexo Compared

Does your crypto show up in your account? And can you get it back? Looking through 100+ complaints about deposits and withdrawals, the insights are obvious but good to know...
- They require additional information like tags (XRP, XLM)
- Had major software changes (BCH, BNB, DAI / MCD, ADA)
So if you're going to move one of these coins, make sure to not forget the extra information or wait a few weeks after the change (to give these companies time to get caught up).
Raw data is below, organized by company and whether it seems the complaint was resolved. Some important notes to consider
  1. Posts about waiting a few hours for a transaction to complete were not counted. Many times (most of the time?) when it takes more than 20 minutes, nothing is broken. E.g. High gas fees on the ethereum network will mean slower processing times for stable coins and other ERC-20 tokens. Less popular tokens, like GUSD, might require people manually going into cold storage. Large (> $30,000 USD) transactions require additional verification. If it takes > 8 hours then yes something is not right. And you should email support and start posting. Otherwise sit tight.
  2. Comments from different people on the same post saying they have the same problem were not counted for "scores". Most of these comments don't add useful information and make it harder to collect the data.
  3. Posts about fiat belong to a different category because a very different set of skills and software features are needed to safely move around dollars, euros, etc. This post is about whether or not your coins are likely to get lost or be unreachable.
  4. I asked "Did this get fixed?" to a lot of people who posted about problems. Not only to see how things turned out. Also to generate a possible data point about the quality of the post. I.e. Trolls and other "special" people venting online can be identified by not bothering to follow up or respond to questions. I also hope this encourages people to not forget to follow up a few weeks later and share a final outcome - good or bad.
Company Resolved Total complaints
BlockFi 50% 2 resolved, 2 not resolved
CDC 58% 29 resolved, 21 not resolved
Celsius 61% 23 resolved, 15 not resolved
Nexo 67% 8 resolved, 4 not resolved
BlockFi (Resolved)
https://www.reddit.com/blockfi/comments/hbcxqq/withdrawal_pending/
https://www.reddit.com/blockfi/comments/dkpy38/tx_confirmed_but_no_deposit/
BlockFi (Not resolved)
https://www.reddit.com/blockfi/comments/gvnbz0/withdrawal_of_large_requires_id_and_facial_scan/
https://www.reddit.com/blockfi/comments/hwqin8/refused_withdrawal_due_to_kyc/

CDC (Resolved)
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/grjphd/is_the_wallet_app_buggy_for_anyone_else_crashes/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/gkduf8/unable_to_add_a_wallet_to_withdraw_funds/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/cpaj2y/issues_with_crypto_invest_portfolio_and/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/ceu0vd/1130pm_hkt_update_withdrawals_and_deposits_are/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/gi62j3/missing_cro_sending_to_the_exchange/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/d6qjtb/thank_you/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/gjx3xp/where_are_my_coins/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/ffiz9x/transfer_bch/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/f7se85/usdt_delisted_on_cryptocom/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/dw8vmn/my_funds_are_being_held_hostage_by_cryptocom_yes/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/clg9r2/cryptocom_is_just_a_regular_bank_be_awared/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/hqa0pm/btc_withdrawal_delay_5_hrs/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/hmjq69/withdrawals_and_deposits_back_online/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/hlro5y/ada_withdraw_erro
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/hlud4t/issues_since_app_update/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/hlukqc/how_long_does_it_usually_take/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/hm66xm/withdrawal_impossible/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/hm81fj/no_bitcoin_withdrawals_since_saturday/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/hm8irg/issue_with_withdrawing_eth/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/hm8kn2/communication_near_to_0/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/hmbo5a/cant_withdraw_any_bitcoin/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/hikkx6/withdrawal_pending/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/h91u4i/issues_on_cryptocom_app/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/hb5fpusdt_withdrawal_from_exchange_doesnt_work_claims/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/hdjrmz/keep_getting_a_withdrawal_erro
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/hebtyf/withdrawal_pending_taking_over_16_hours/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/hgt61j/one_exchange_withdrawal_two_app_deposits/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/htf578/withdrawal_dia_is_taking_8_hrs/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/he151z/btc_withdrawal_delay/
CDC (Not resolved)
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/gx2oyo/pending_withdrawal/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/gk8wlc/wont_let_me_buy_or_withdraw/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/gh6v2c/usdc_withdrawing_to_external_address/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/ggk51x/cryptocom_withdrawal/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/g925xg/withdraw_blocked/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/cfjess/withdraw_is_in_progress_from_23h/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/gk8wlc/wont_let_me_buy_or_withdraw/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/9xbi1c/withdrawals_delayed/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/cga2eq/delayed_transfe
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/hd1to7/missing_funds_from_the_exchange_after_the/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/grr4vh/crypto_wallet_scammed_me_beware/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/cg5zfj/helpbnb_wallet_address_in_app_is_still_old_eth/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/hrwpsq/btc_withdrawl_pending_for_24_hours_zero_custome
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/hpteje/how_to_withdraw_cro_from_the_exchange/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/hottg4/cryptocom_app_is_not_working/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/ha8o7v/problem_with_the_2fa_need_help_pls/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/he3qco/btc_withdraw_pending_post_7_hours/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/he45kj/withdrawal_stuck/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/heb85q/btc_withdraw_pending_72_hours_now/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/hhqruv/withdrawal_from_cryptocom_wallet_to_cryptocom_app/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/hihl04/i_cant_withdraw_whats_happening/

Celsius (Resolved)
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/gantb4/withdraw_delay/fp11iut/?context=3
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/gb7c4t/withdrawal_still_pending_only_for_btc/fp4wmc3/?context=3
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/gncvj9/my_withdraw_experience_with_celsius_network/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/fk844a/over_20k_withdrawals_processing_time/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/fhftgh/where_do_i_find_pending_or_past_withdrawals/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/epl29a/cant_withdraw_my_deposited_sai_as_a_texas_resident/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/dn0vg2/problem_withdrawing_eth_from_celsius_account/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/cw00t5/not_receiving_withdrawal_confirmation_email/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/ci3h6w/eth_withdrawal_appears_as_an_internal_transaction/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/c2w5gk/unable_to_withdraw_anything_from_the_app/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/br2v75/how_do_i_withdraw_the_interest/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/bqynbv/unable_to_withdraw_full_account_balance/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/a9d2vj/withdrawals_of_any_currency_are_not_currently/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/gfby9l/celsius_fixed_my_deposit_issue/fpw51u3/?context=3
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/g9oiea/deposit_missing/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/dkb55t/deposit_not_showing_up/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/eudo3n/not_receiving_deposited_bitcoin/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/gepzpp/all_good_all_fix/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/hf334d/withdrawal_issue_trueusd_tusd_stable_coin/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/hiriqz/celsius_is_witholding_my_crypto/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/hjv0io/dai_withdrawal_pending_for_24hrs_subsequently/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/hme5xm/its_been_more_than_3_days_of_withdrawing_my_usdc/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/hvi45o/eth_and_cel_good_on_etherscan_not_show_in_app/
Celsius (Not resolved)
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/fbpnw4/why_this_app_shutdown_when_we_try_to_change/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/f7i2f3/withdrawal_issues/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/f4ptd7/cant_get_my_crypto_not_getting_withdrawal_emails/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/ea3hi5/eth_withdrawal_made_from_a_smart_contract/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/cb08he/can_you_withdraw_to_a_bech32_btc_address/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/c8yovc/minimum_withdraws/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/bqqiqg/i_cant_withdraw_my_eth/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/askghy/what_is_the_withdrawal_fees_service_told_me_there/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/gtjoc9/btc_withdraw_transaction_still_pensing_after_1_day/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/g9f7ym/stolen_or_lost_deposits_hold_off_on_transferring/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/gf8v3i/mcdai_deposit_pending_for_days/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/d1sc3q/eth_deposit_address_is_a_contract_address/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/ca2wpd/warning_celsius_does_lock_up_your_funds/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/hnu53f/is_anyone_else_having_trouble_withdrawing_xrp/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/hv2czp/celsius_received_thousands_of_dollars_of_my_funds/

Nexo (Resolved)
https://www.reddit.com/Nexo/comments/gixzgu/cant_deposit_or_withdraw_stablecoins_right_now/
https://www.reddit.com/Nexo/comments/flshbb/my_withdraw_was_rejected/
https://www.reddit.com/Nexo/comments/fiit3u/nexo_withdrawal/
https://www.reddit.com/Nexo/comments/e2ij06/withdrawal_problems/
https://www.reddit.com/Nexo/comments/fhgmxg/missing_deposit/
https://www.reddit.com/Nexo/comments/f3z9kq/account_showing_no_balance/
https://www.reddit.com/Nexo/comments/gj3ub0/bnb_withdrawals/
https://www.reddit.com/Nexo/comments/hlxpnd/i_made_an_eth_deposit_36_hours_ago_the_txid_shows/
Nexo (Not resolved)
https://www.reddit.com/Nexo/comments/dpvrgj/nexo_withdrawal_pending_1_day/
https://www.reddit.com/Nexo/comments/dno3up/withdrawal_email_confirmation/
https://www.reddit.com/Nexo/comments/dm6nn9/withdraw_from_binance_dex/
https://www.reddit.com/Nexo/comments/c67gis/anyone_else_having_problems_with_loan_withdrawals/
submitted by thegoldlust to Crypto_com [link] [comments]

Where's My Money? Deposits And Withdrawals At Blockfi, Celsius, Crypto.Com And Nexo Compared

Does your crypto show up in your account? And can you get it back? Looking through 100+ complaints about deposits and withdrawals, the insights are obvious but good to know...
- They require additional information like tags (XRP, XLM)
- Had major software changes (BCH, BNB, DAI / MCD, ADA)
So if you're going to move one of these coins, make sure to not forget the extra information or wait a few weeks after the change (to give these companies time to get caught up).
Raw data is below, organized by company and whether it seems the complaint was resolved. Some important notes to consider
  1. Posts about waiting a few hours for a transaction to complete were not counted. Many times (most of the time?) when it takes more than 20 minutes, nothing is broken. E.g. High gas fees on the ethereum network will mean slower processing times for stable coins and other ERC-20 tokens. Less popular tokens, like GUSD, might require people manually going into cold storage. Large (> $30,000 USD) transactions require additional verification. If it takes > 8 hours then yes something is not right. And you should email support and start posting. Otherwise sit tight.
  2. Comments from different people on the same post saying they have the same problem were not counted for "scores". Most of these comments don't add useful information and make it harder to collect the data.
  3. Posts about fiat belong to a different category because a very different set of skills and software features are needed to safely move around dollars, euros, etc. This post is about whether or not your coins are likely to get lost or be unreachable.
  4. I asked "Did this get fixed?" to a lot of people who posted about problems. Not only to see how things turned out. Also to generate a possible data point about the quality of the post. I.e. Trolls and other "special" people venting online can be identified by not bothering to follow up or respond to questions. I also hope this encourages people to not forget to follow up a few weeks later and share a final outcome - good or bad.
Company Resolved Total complaints
BlockFi 50% 2 resolved, 2 not resolved
CDC 58% 29 resolved, 21 not resolved
Celsius 61% 23 resolved, 15 not resolved
Nexo 67% 8 resolved, 4 not resolved
BlockFi (Resolved)
https://www.reddit.com/blockfi/comments/hbcxqq/withdrawal_pending/
https://www.reddit.com/blockfi/comments/dkpy38/tx_confirmed_but_no_deposit/
BlockFi (Not resolved)
https://www.reddit.com/blockfi/comments/gvnbz0/withdrawal_of_large_requires_id_and_facial_scan/
https://www.reddit.com/blockfi/comments/hwqin8/refused_withdrawal_due_to_kyc/

CDC (Resolved)
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/grjphd/is_the_wallet_app_buggy_for_anyone_else_crashes/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/gkduf8/unable_to_add_a_wallet_to_withdraw_funds/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/cpaj2y/issues_with_crypto_invest_portfolio_and/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/ceu0vd/1130pm_hkt_update_withdrawals_and_deposits_are/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/gi62j3/missing_cro_sending_to_the_exchange/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/d6qjtb/thank_you/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/gjx3xp/where_are_my_coins/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/ffiz9x/transfer_bch/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/f7se85/usdt_delisted_on_cryptocom/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/dw8vmn/my_funds_are_being_held_hostage_by_cryptocom_yes/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/clg9r2/cryptocom_is_just_a_regular_bank_be_awared/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/hqa0pm/btc_withdrawal_delay_5_hrs/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/hmjq69/withdrawals_and_deposits_back_online/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/hlro5y/ada_withdraw_erro
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/hlud4t/issues_since_app_update/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/hlukqc/how_long_does_it_usually_take/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/hm66xm/withdrawal_impossible/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/hm81fj/no_bitcoin_withdrawals_since_saturday/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/hm8irg/issue_with_withdrawing_eth/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/hm8kn2/communication_near_to_0/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/hmbo5a/cant_withdraw_any_bitcoin/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/hikkx6/withdrawal_pending/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/h91u4i/issues_on_cryptocom_app/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/hb5fpusdt_withdrawal_from_exchange_doesnt_work_claims/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/hdjrmz/keep_getting_a_withdrawal_erro
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/hebtyf/withdrawal_pending_taking_over_16_hours/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/hgt61j/one_exchange_withdrawal_two_app_deposits/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/htf578/withdrawal_dia_is_taking_8_hrs/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/he151z/btc_withdrawal_delay/
CDC (Not resolved)
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/gx2oyo/pending_withdrawal/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/gk8wlc/wont_let_me_buy_or_withdraw/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/gh6v2c/usdc_withdrawing_to_external_address/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/ggk51x/cryptocom_withdrawal/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/g925xg/withdraw_blocked/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/cfjess/withdraw_is_in_progress_from_23h/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/gk8wlc/wont_let_me_buy_or_withdraw/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/9xbi1c/withdrawals_delayed/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/cga2eq/delayed_transfe
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/hd1to7/missing_funds_from_the_exchange_after_the/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/grr4vh/crypto_wallet_scammed_me_beware/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/cg5zfj/helpbnb_wallet_address_in_app_is_still_old_eth/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/hrwpsq/btc_withdrawl_pending_for_24_hours_zero_custome
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/hpteje/how_to_withdraw_cro_from_the_exchange/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/hottg4/cryptocom_app_is_not_working/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/ha8o7v/problem_with_the_2fa_need_help_pls/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/he3qco/btc_withdraw_pending_post_7_hours/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/he45kj/withdrawal_stuck/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/heb85q/btc_withdraw_pending_72_hours_now/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/hhqruv/withdrawal_from_cryptocom_wallet_to_cryptocom_app/
https://www.reddit.com/Crypto_com/comments/hihl04/i_cant_withdraw_whats_happening/

Celsius (Resolved)
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/gantb4/withdraw_delay/fp11iut/?context=3
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/gb7c4t/withdrawal_still_pending_only_for_btc/fp4wmc3/?context=3
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/gncvj9/my_withdraw_experience_with_celsius_network/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/fk844a/over_20k_withdrawals_processing_time/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/fhftgh/where_do_i_find_pending_or_past_withdrawals/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/epl29a/cant_withdraw_my_deposited_sai_as_a_texas_resident/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/dn0vg2/problem_withdrawing_eth_from_celsius_account/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/cw00t5/not_receiving_withdrawal_confirmation_email/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/ci3h6w/eth_withdrawal_appears_as_an_internal_transaction/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/c2w5gk/unable_to_withdraw_anything_from_the_app/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/br2v75/how_do_i_withdraw_the_interest/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/bqynbv/unable_to_withdraw_full_account_balance/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/a9d2vj/withdrawals_of_any_currency_are_not_currently/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/gfby9l/celsius_fixed_my_deposit_issue/fpw51u3/?context=3
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/g9oiea/deposit_missing/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/dkb55t/deposit_not_showing_up/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/eudo3n/not_receiving_deposited_bitcoin/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/gepzpp/all_good_all_fix/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/hf334d/withdrawal_issue_trueusd_tusd_stable_coin/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/hiriqz/celsius_is_witholding_my_crypto/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/hjv0io/dai_withdrawal_pending_for_24hrs_subsequently/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/hme5xm/its_been_more_than_3_days_of_withdrawing_my_usdc/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/hvi45o/eth_and_cel_good_on_etherscan_not_show_in_app/
Celsius (Not resolved)
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/fbpnw4/why_this_app_shutdown_when_we_try_to_change/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/f7i2f3/withdrawal_issues/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/f4ptd7/cant_get_my_crypto_not_getting_withdrawal_emails/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/ea3hi5/eth_withdrawal_made_from_a_smart_contract/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/cb08he/can_you_withdraw_to_a_bech32_btc_address/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/c8yovc/minimum_withdraws/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/bqqiqg/i_cant_withdraw_my_eth/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/askghy/what_is_the_withdrawal_fees_service_told_me_there/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/gtjoc9/btc_withdraw_transaction_still_pensing_after_1_day/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/g9f7ym/stolen_or_lost_deposits_hold_off_on_transferring/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/gf8v3i/mcdai_deposit_pending_for_days/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/d1sc3q/eth_deposit_address_is_a_contract_address/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/ca2wpd/warning_celsius_does_lock_up_your_funds/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/hnu53f/is_anyone_else_having_trouble_withdrawing_xrp/
https://www.reddit.com/CelsiusNetwork/comments/hv2czp/celsius_received_thousands_of_dollars_of_my_funds/

Nexo (Resolved)
https://www.reddit.com/Nexo/comments/gixzgu/cant_deposit_or_withdraw_stablecoins_right_now/
https://www.reddit.com/Nexo/comments/flshbb/my_withdraw_was_rejected/
https://www.reddit.com/Nexo/comments/fiit3u/nexo_withdrawal/
https://www.reddit.com/Nexo/comments/e2ij06/withdrawal_problems/
https://www.reddit.com/Nexo/comments/fhgmxg/missing_deposit/
https://www.reddit.com/Nexo/comments/f3z9kq/account_showing_no_balance/
https://www.reddit.com/Nexo/comments/gj3ub0/bnb_withdrawals/
https://www.reddit.com/Nexo/comments/hlxpnd/i_made_an_eth_deposit_36_hours_ago_the_txid_shows/
Nexo (Not resolved)
https://www.reddit.com/Nexo/comments/dpvrgj/nexo_withdrawal_pending_1_day/
https://www.reddit.com/Nexo/comments/dno3up/withdrawal_email_confirmation/
https://www.reddit.com/Nexo/comments/dm6nn9/withdraw_from_binance_dex/
https://www.reddit.com/Nexo/comments/c67gis/anyone_else_having_problems_with_loan_withdrawals/
submitted by thegoldlust to CelsiusNetwork [link] [comments]

The events of a SIM swap attack (and defense tips)

Posted this on Coinbase and someone recommend it also be posted here. The information below on an attempted SIM swap attack was pieced together through a combination of login and security logs, recovering emails initiated by the attacker that were deleted and then deleted again from the trash folder, and learning from AT&T’s fraud representatives. The majority if this is factual, and we do our best to note where we are speculating or providing a circumstantial suspicion. TLDRs at the bottom.
The full story:
We were going about our business and received a text from AT&T that says “…Calls & texts will go to your new phone/SIM card. Call 866-563-4705 if you did not request.” We did not request this, and were suspicious that the text itself could be a phishing scam since we searched the phone number and it wasn’t overtly associated with AT&T. Thus, we tried calling AT&T’s main line at 611 but all we hear is beep beep beep. The phone number is already gone. We use another phone to call AT&T and at the same time start working on our already compromised email.
While we didn’t see everything real time, this is what the recovered emails show. In less than 2 minutes after receiving the text from AT&T, there is already an email indicating that the stolen phone number was used to sign into our email account associated with Coinbase. 2 minutes after that, there is an email from Coinbase saying:
"We have received your request for password reset from an unverified device. As a security precaution, an e-mail with a reset link will be sent to you in 24 hours. Alternatively, if you would like your password reset to be processed immediately, please submit a request using a verified device.
This 24 hour review period is designed to protect your Coinbase account."
This is where Coinbase got it right to have a 24 hour review period (actually a recovery period) before allowing the password to be reset. However, the attackers knew this and planned to steal the second email from Coinbase by setting email rules to forward all emails to a burner address and also have any emails containing “coinbase” re-routed so they don’t appear in the Inbox. 5 minutes later, they request a password reset from Gemini and the password was reset to the attacker’s password within a minute after that. The next minute they target and reset DropBox’s password followed immediately with Binance. Less than 2 minutes later, an email from Binance indicates that the password has been reset and another email arrives a minute later indicating a new device has been authorized.
It’s at this point that we begin locking the attacker out by (1) removing the phone number as 2FA (2) changing the email password, (3) and three forcing a logout of all sessions from the email. There was a bit of back and forth where they still had an active login and re-added the stolen phone number as 2FA.
They added only one more password reset to a gaming account that was not deleted. I can only suspect that was a decoy to make it look like the attack was directed at gaming rather than finances.
The Gemini and Binance accounts were empty and effectively abandoned, with no balances and inactive bank accounts (if any), and no transactions in 1-3 years. DropBox had no meaningful files (they probably look for private keys and authenticator backups) and the phone number they stole from us was suspended, so as far as the attacker is concerned, there is no meat on this bone to attack again… unless they had inside information.
This is where I suspect someone internal at Coinbase receiving wire deposits has been compromised in tipping off ripe accounts – accounts with new and somewhat large balances. We had completed a full withdrawal of funds from Coinbase earlier in the year, and had a balance of less than $20 heading into May. Deposits to Coinbase staggered in to get above six figures through mid-May then stopped. The attack occurred 7 days after the last large wire deposit was made to Coinbase.
From the perspective of an attacker that had no inside information, we were a dead end with abandoned Gemini and Binance accounts with zero balances and stale transactions, no DropBox information, and the suspended phone number access. Our Coinbase deposits were known to no one except us, Coinbase, and our bank. We were also able to stop the hacker’s email forwarding before Coinbase’s 24 hour period to send the password reset, so this one didn’t work out for the attackers and it would make sense for them to move on to the next rather than put efforts into a second attack only for Coinbase - for what would appear to be a zero-balance Coinbase account based on the other stale accounts.
Then…23 hours and 42 minutes after the first attack, another message from AT&T “…Calls & texts will go to your new phone/SIM card. Call 866-563-4705 if you did not request.” Here we go again. We had been confident in AT&T’s assurances that our account had been locked and would not be SIM swapped again, so we unwisely added the phone number back to our email account as a backup (it’s now removed permanently and we use burner emails for account recovery like we should have all along).
Upon seeing that our phone number had been stolen again I knew they were after the Coinbase reset email that was delayed by 24 hours from Coinbase as part of their security. We did 4 things within 2 minutes of that text: (1) removed the phone number again from the email account – this time for good, (2) market sell all Bitcoin on Coinbase, (3) withdraw from Coinbase, (4) have AT&T suspend service on the phone line.
In speaking with AT&T, they were floored that our SIM would be transferred again in light of all the notes about fraud on the account and the PIN being changed to random digits that had never been used by us before. Based on the response of disbelief from AT&T on the second port, I suspect that this attack also involved a compromised AT&T employee that worked with the attacker to provide timely access to the Coinbase password reset email. Apparently, this has been going on for years: https://www.flashpoint-intel.com/blog/sim-swap-fraud-account-takeove
with phone carrier employees swapping SIMs for $80s a swap.
Remember that most of this was hidden in real time, and was only known because we were able to recover emails deleted from Trash by the attacker.
Since we require any withdrawals to use Google Authenticator on Coinbase, our funds may have been secure nonetheless. However, under the circumstances with attackers that were apparently working with insiders to take our phone number twice in attempts to steal Bitcoin, and it being unknown if they had additional tools related to our Google Authenticator, we decided it was safer on the sidelines. The coins were held on the exchange for a quick exit depending on whether Bitcoin was going to break up or down from $10,000. A hardware wallet is always safest, but we were looking to time the market and not have transaction delays.
For some some security recommendations:
AT&T: If you are going to send a text saying that calls and texts are moving to a new number, provide a 10 minute window for the phone number to reply with a “NO” or “STOP” to prevent the move. This can escalate the SIM dispute to more trusted employees to determine who actually owns the line. Don’t let entry level employees swap SIMs.
Coinbase: Do not default to phone numbers as 2FA. Also, if someone logs in successfully with the password before the 24 hours are up, the password is known and there is no need to send the password reset email again for attacker to have forwarded to them. At least have an option to stop the password reset email from being sent. We did not tag our account at Coinbase with fraud because of the stories of frozen funds once an account is tagged. I’m not sure what the solution is there, but that is another problem.
Being a trader, it would be nice to think of Coinbase as any other type of security brokerage where your assets are yours (someone can’t steal your phone number and transfer your stocks to their account). We fell into that mindset of security, yet this experience has reminded us of the uniqueness of cryptocurrency and the lack of custodial assurance and insurance from exchanges because of the possession-is-everything properties of cryptocurrency.
As many have said before, 2FA with a phone number quickly becomes 1-factor authentication as soon as that phone number is associated with password recovery on your email or other accounts. Our overall recommendation is to avoid having a phone number associated with any recovery options across all your accounts.
TLDR on the process:
Scammers will steal your phone number (in our case twice in 24 hours) and use your phone number to access your email and accounts. They will use your email to reset passwords at financial accounts and file hosting such as DropBox. They will then use that combination to transfer any assets they can access from your accounts to theirs. They will do their best to hide this from you by
(1) not resetting your email password so as to raise suspicion,
(2) immediately delete any password reset emails you may receive from financial accounts to hide them from you,
(3) attempt to forward all emails sent to your address to a burner email, and
(4) set email rules to forward emails containing “coinbase” to an email folder other than your Inbox so that you don’t see the transactions and password reset emails that arrive to your inbox.
TLDR on defense tips: If your phone stops working or you receive a text of your number being ported do the following as soon as possible:
(1) log into your email account(s) associated with your financial accounts and remove your phone number as 2FA immediately
(2) change your email password,
(3) force a logout of all sessions from your email (at this point you have locked them out), then
(4) check your mail forwarding settings for forwards to burner addresses,
(5) check your mail rules for rerouting of emails from accounts such as Coinbase, and
(6) call your carrier to have them suspend service on your lost phone number and ask them to reinstate your SIM or get a new SIM. This will require a second phone because your personal phone number has been stolen.
We hope this helps some others be safe out there in protecting their coins. The more we know, the more we can protect ourselves. Wishing you all the best!
submitted by etheregg to CryptoCurrency [link] [comments]

The events of a SIM swap attack directed at Coinbase (and defense tips)

The information below on an attempted SIM swap attack was pieced together through a combination of login and security logs, recovering emails initiated by the attacker that were deleted and then deleted again from the trash folder, and learning from AT&T’s fraud representatives. The majority if this is factual, and we do our best to note where we are speculating or providing a circumstantial suspicion. TLDRs at the bottom.
The full story:
We were going about our business and received a text from AT&T that says “…Calls & texts will go to your new phone/SIM card. Call 866-563-4705 if you did not request.” We did not request this, and were suspicious that the text itself could be a phishing scam since we searched the phone number and it wasn’t overtly associated with AT&T. Thus, we tried calling AT&T’s main line at 611 but all we hear is beep beep beep. The phone number is already gone. We use another phone to call AT&T and at the same time start working on our already compromised email.
While we didn’t see everything real time, this is what the recovered emails show. In less than 2 minutes after receiving the text from AT&T, there is already an email indicating that the stolen phone number was used to sign into our email account associated with Coinbase. 2 minutes after that, there is an email from Coinbase saying:
"We have received your request for password reset from an unverified device. As a security precaution, an e-mail with a reset link will be sent to you in 24 hours. Alternatively, if you would like your password reset to be processed immediately, please submit a request using a verified device.
This 24 hour review period is designed to protect your Coinbase account."
This is where Coinbase got it right to have a 24 hour review period (actually a recovery period) before allowing the password to be reset. However, the attackers knew this and planned to steal the second email from Coinbase by setting email rules to forward all emails to a burner address and also have any emails containing “coinbase” re-routed so they don’t appear in the Inbox. 5 minutes later, they request a password reset from Gemini and the password was reset to the attacker’s password within a minute after that. The next minute they target and reset DropBox’s password followed immediately with Binance. Less than 2 minutes later, an email from Binance indicates that the password has been reset and another email arrives a minute later indicating a new device has been authorized.
It’s at this point that we begin locking the attacker out by (1) removing the phone number as 2FA (2) changing the email password, (3) and three forcing a logout of all sessions from the email. There was a bit of back and forth where they still had an active login and re-added the stolen phone number as 2FA.
They added only one more password reset to a gaming account that was not deleted. I can only suspect that was a decoy to make it look like the attack was directed at gaming rather than finances.
The Gemini and Binance accounts were empty and effectively abandoned, with no balances and inactive bank accounts (if any), and no transactions in 1-3 years. DropBox had no meaningful files (they probably look for private keys and authenticator backups) and the phone number they stole from us was suspended, so as far as the attacker is concerned, there is no meat on this bone to attack again… unless they had inside information.
This is where I suspect someone internal at Coinbase receiving wire deposits has been compromised in tipping off ripe accounts – accounts with new and somewhat large balances. We had completed a full withdrawal of funds from Coinbase earlier in the year, and had a balance of less than $20 heading into May. Deposits to Coinbase staggered in to get above six figures through mid-May then stopped. The attack occurred 7 days after the last large wire deposit was made to Coinbase.
From the perspective of an attacker that had no inside information, we were a dead end with abandoned Gemini and Binance accounts with zero balances and stale transactions, no DropBox information, and the suspended phone number access. Our Coinbase deposits were known to no one except us, Coinbase, and our bank. We were also able to stop the hacker’s email forwarding before Coinbase’s 24 hour period to send the password reset, so this one didn’t work out for the attackers and it would make sense for them to move on to the next rather than put efforts into a second attack only for Coinbase - for what would appear to be a zero-balance Coinbase account based on the other stale accounts.
Then…23 hours and 42 minutes after the first attack, another message from AT&T “…Calls & texts will go to your new phone/SIM card. Call 866-563-4705 if you did not request.” Here we go again. We had been confident in AT&T’s assurances that our account had been locked and would not be SIM swapped again, so we unwisely added the phone number back to our email account as a backup (it’s now removed permanently and we use burner emails for account recovery like we should have all along).
Upon seeing that our phone number had been stolen again I knew they were after the Coinbase reset email that was delayed by 24 hours from Coinbase as part of their security. We did 4 things within 2 minutes of that text: (1) removed the phone number again from the email account – this time for good, (2) market sell all Bitcoin on Coinbase, (3) withdraw from Coinbase, (4) have AT&T suspend service on the phone line.
In speaking with AT&T, they were floored that our SIM would be transferred again in light of all the notes about fraud on the account and the PIN being changed to random digits that had never been used by us before. Based on the response of disbelief from AT&T on the second port, I suspect that this attack also involved a compromised AT&T employee that worked with the attacker to provide timely access to the Coinbase password reset email. Apparently, this has been going on for years: https://www.flashpoint-intel.com/blog/sim-swap-fraud-account-takeove with phone carrier employees swapping SIMs for $80s a swap.
Remember that most of this was hidden in real time, and was only known because we were able to recover emails deleted from Trash by the attacker.
Since we require any withdrawals to use Google Authenticator on Coinbase, our funds may have been secure nonetheless. However, under the circumstances with attackers that were apparently working with insiders to take our phone number twice in attempts to steal Bitcoin, and it being unknown if they had additional tools related to our Google Authenticator, we decided it was safer on the sidelines. The coins were held on the exchange for a quick exit depending on whether Bitcoin was going to break up or down from $10,000. A hardware wallet is always safest, but we were looking to time the market and not have transaction delays.
For some some security recommendations:
AT&T: If you are going to send a text saying that calls and texts are moving to a new number, provide a 10 minute window for the phone number to reply with a “NO” or “STOP” to prevent the move. This can escalate the SIM dispute to more trusted employees to determine who actually owns the line. Don’t let entry level employees swap SIMs.
Coinbase: Do not default to phone numbers as 2FA. Also, if someone logs in successfully with the password before the 24 hours are up, the password is known and there is no need to send the password reset email again for attacker to have forwarded to them. At least have an option to stop the password reset email from being sent. We did not tag our account at Coinbase with fraud because of the stories of frozen funds once an account is tagged. I’m not sure what the solution is there, but that is another problem.
Being a trader, it would be nice to think of Coinbase as any other type of security brokerage where your assets are yours (someone can’t steal your phone number and transfer your stocks to their account). We fell into that mindset of security, yet this experience has reminded us of the uniqueness of cryptocurrency and the lack of custodial assurance and insurance from exchanges because of the possession-is-everything properties of cryptocurrency.
As many have said before, 2FA with a phone number quickly becomes 1-factor authentication as soon as that phone number is associated with password recovery on your email or other accounts. Our overall recommendation is to avoid having a phone number associated with any recovery options across all your accounts.
TLDR on the process:
Scammers will steal your phone number (in our case twice in 24 hours) and use your phone number to access your email and accounts. They will use your email to reset passwords at financial accounts and file hosting such as DropBox. They will then use that combination to transfer any assets they can access from your accounts to theirs. They will do their best to hide this from you by
(1) not resetting your email password so as to raise suspicion,
(2) immediately delete any password reset emails you may receive from financial accounts to hide them from you,
(3) attempt to forward all emails sent to your address to a burner email, and
(4) set email rules to forward emails containing “coinbase” to an email folder other than your Inbox so that you don’t see the transactions and password reset emails that arrive to your inbox.
TLDR on defense tips: If your phone stops working or you receive a text of your number being ported do the following as soon as possible:
(1) log into your email account(s) associated with your financial accounts and remove your phone number as 2FA immediately
(2) change your email password,
(3) force a logout of all sessions from your email (at this point you have locked them out), then
(4) check your mail forwarding settings for forwards to burner addresses,
(5) check your mail rules for rerouting of emails from accounts such as Coinbase, and
(6) call your carrier to have them suspend service on your lost phone number and ask them to reinstate your SIM or get a new SIM. This will require a second phone because your personal phone number has been stolen.
We hope this helps some others be safe out there in protecting their coins. The more we know, the more we can protect ourselves. Wishing you all the best!
submitted by etheregg to CoinBase [link] [comments]

How To End The Cryptocurrency Exchange "Wild West" Without Crippling Innovation


In case you haven't noticed the consultation paper, staff notice, and report on Quadriga, regulators are now clamping down on Canadian cryptocurrency exchanges. The OSC and other regulatory bodies are still interested in industry feedback. They have not put forward any official regulation yet. Below are some ideas/insights and a proposed framework.



Many of you have limited time to read the full proposal, so here are the highlights:

Offline Multi-Signature

Effective standards to prevent both internal and external theft. Exchange operators are trained and certified, and have a legal responsibility to users.

Regular Transparent Audits

Provides visibility to Canadians that their funds are fully backed on the exchange, while protecting privacy and sensitive platform information.

Insurance Requirements

Establishment of basic insurance standards/strategy, to expand over time. Removing risk to exchange users of any hot wallet theft.


Background and Justifications


Cold Storage Custody/Management
After reviewing close to 100 cases, all thefts tend to break down into more or less the same set of problems:
• Funds stored online or in a smart contract,
• Access controlled by one person or one system,
• 51% attacks (rare),
• Funds sent to the wrong address (also rare), or
• Some combination of the above.
For the first two cases, practical solutions exist and are widely implemented on exchanges already. Offline multi-signature solutions are already industry standard. No cases studied found an external theft or exit scam involving an offline multi-signature wallet implementation. Security can be further improved through minimum numbers of signatories, background checks, providing autonomy and legal protections to each signatory, establishing best practices, and a training/certification program.
The last two transaction risks occur more rarely, and have never resulted in a loss affecting the actual users of the exchange. In all cases to date where operators made the mistake, they've been fully covered by the exchange platforms.
• 51% attacks generally only occur on blockchains with less security. The most prominent cases have been Bitcoin Gold and Ethereum Classic. The simple solution is to enforce deposit limits and block delays such that a 51% attack is not cost-effective.
• The risk of transactions to incorrect addresses can be eliminated by a simple test transaction policy on large transactions. By sending a small amount of funds prior to any large withdrawals/transfers as a standard practice, the accuracy of the wallet address can be validated.
The proposal covers all loss cases and goes beyond, while avoiding significant additional costs, risks, and limitations which may be associated with other frameworks like SOC II.

On The Subject of Third Party Custodians
Many Canadian platforms are currently experimenting with third party custody. From the standpoint of the exchange operator, they can liberate themselves from some responsibility of custody, passing that off to someone else. For regulators, it puts crypto in similar categorization to oil, gold, and other commodities, with some common standards. Platform users would likely feel greater confidence if the custodian was a brand they recognized. If the custodian was knowledgeable and had a decent team that employed multi-sig, they could keep assets safe from internal theft. With the right protections in place, this could be a great solution for many exchanges, particularly those that lack the relevant experience or human resources for their own custody systems.
However, this system is vulnerable to anyone able to impersonate the exchange operators. You may have a situation where different employees who don't know each other that well are interacting between different companies (both the custodian and all their customers which presumably isn't just one exchange). A case study of what can go wrong in this type of environment might be Bitpay, where the CEO was tricked out of 5000 bitcoins over 3 separate payments by a series of emails sent legitimately from a breached computer of another company CEO. It's also still vulnerable to the platform being compromised, as in the really large $70M Bitfinex hack, where the third party Bitgo held one key in a multi-sig wallet. The hacker simply authorized the withdrawal using the same credentials as Bitfinex (requesting Bitgo to sign multiple withdrawal transactions). This succeeded even with the use of multi-sig and two heavily security-focused companies, due to the lack of human oversight (basically, hot wallet). Of course, you can learn from these cases and improve the security, but so can hackers improve their deception and at the end of the day, both of these would have been stopped by the much simpler solution of a qualified team who knew each other and employed multi-sig with properly protected keys. It's pretty hard to beat a human being who knows the business and the typical customer behaviour (or even knows their customers personally) at spotting fraud, and the proposed multi-sig means any hacker has to get through the scrutiny of 3 (or more) separate people, all of whom would have proper training including historical case studies.
There are strong arguments both for and against using use of third party custodians. The proposal sets mandatory minimum custody standards would apply regardless if the cold wallet signatories are exchange operators, independent custodians, or a mix of both.

On The Subject Of Insurance
ShakePay has taken the first steps into this new realm (congratulations). There is no question that crypto users could be better protected by the right insurance policies, and it certainly feels better to transact with insured platforms. The steps required to obtain insurance generally place attention in valuable security areas, and in this case included a review from CipherTrace. One of the key solutions in traditional finance comes from insurance from entities such as the CDIC.
However, historically, there wasn't found any actual insurance payout to any cryptocurrency exchange, and there are notable cases where insurance has not paid. With Bitpay, for example, the insurance agent refused because the issue happened to the third party CEO's computer instead of anything to do with Bitpay itself. With the Youbit exchange in South Korea, their insurance claim was denied, and the exchange ultimately ended up instead going bankrupt with all user's funds lost. To quote Matt Johnson in the original Lloyd's article: “You can create an insurance policy that protects no one – you know there are so many caveats to the policy that it’s not super protective.”
ShakePay's insurance was only reported to cover their cold storage, and “physical theft of the media where the private keys are held”. Physical theft has never, in the history of cryptocurrency exchange cases reviewed, been reported as the cause of loss. From the limited information of the article, ShakePay made it clear their funds are in the hands of a single US custodian, and at least part of their security strategy is to "decline[] to confirm the custodian’s name on the record". While this prevents scrutiny of the custodian, it's pretty silly to speculate that a reasonably competent hacking group couldn't determine who the custodian is. A far more common infiltration strategy historically would be social engineering, which has succeeded repeatedly. A hacker could trick their way into ShakePay's systems and request a fraudulent withdrawal, impersonate ShakePay and request the custodian to move funds, or socially engineer their way into the custodian to initiate the withdrawal of multiple accounts (a payout much larger than ShakePay) exploiting the standard procedures (for example, fraudulently initiating or override the wallet addresses of a real transfer). In each case, nothing was physically stolen and the loss is therefore not covered by insurance.
In order for any insurance to be effective, clear policies have to be established about what needs to be covered. Anything short of that gives Canadians false confidence that they are protected when they aren't in any meaningful way. At this time, the third party insurance market does not appear to provide adequate options or coverage, and effort is necessary to standardize custody standards, which is a likely first step in ultimately setting up an insurance framework.
A better solution compared to third party insurance providers might be for Canadian exchange operators to create their own collective insurance fund, or a specific federal organization similar to the CDIC. Such an organization would have a greater interest or obligation in paying out actual cases, and that would be it's purpose rather than maximizing it's own profit. This would be similar to the SAFU which Binance has launched, except it would cover multiple exchanges. There is little question whether the SAFU would pay out given a breach of Binance, and a similar argument could be made for a insurance fund managed by a collective of exchange operators or a government organization. While a third party insurance provider has the strong market incentive to provide the absolute minimum coverage and no market incentive to payout, an entity managed by exchange operators would have incentive to protect the reputation of exchange operators/the industry, and the government should have the interest of protecting Canadians.

On The Subject of Fractional Reserve
There is a long history of fractional reserve failures, from the first banks in ancient times, through the great depression (where hundreds of fractional reserve banks failed), right through to the 2008 banking collapse referenced in the first bitcoin block. The fractional reserve system allows banks to multiply the money supply far beyond the actual cash (or other assets) in existence, backed only by a system of debt obligations of others. Safely supporting a fractional reserve system is a topic of far greater complexity than can be addressed by a simple policy, and when it comes to cryptocurrency, there is presently no entity reasonably able to bail anyone out in the event of failure. Therefore, this framework is addressed around entities that aim to maintain 100% backing of funds.
There may be some firms that desire but have failed to maintain 100% backing. In this case, there are multiple solutions, including outside investment, merging with other exchanges, or enforcing a gradual restoration plan. All of these solutions are typically far better than shutting down the exchange, and there are multiple cases where they've been used successfully in the past.

Proof of Reserves/Transparency/Accountability
Canadians need to have visibility into the backing on an ongoing basis.
The best solution for crypto-assets is a Proof of Reserve. Such ideas go back all the way to 2013, before even Mt. Gox. However, no Canadian exchange has yet implemented such a system, and only a few international exchanges (CoinFloor in the UK being an example) have. Many firms like Kraken, BitBuy, and now ShakePay use the Proof of Reserve term to refer to lesser proofs which do not actually cryptographically prove the full backing of all user assets on the blockchain. In order for a Proof of Reserve to be effective, it must actually be a complete proof, and it needs to be understood by the public that is expected to use it. Many firms have expressed reservations about the level of transparency required in a complete Proof of Reserve (for example Kraken here). While a complete Proof of Reserves should be encouraged, and there are some solutions in the works (ie TxQuick), this is unlikely to be suitable universally for all exchange operators and users.
Given the limitations, and that firms also manage fiat assets, a more traditional audit process makes more sense. Some Canadian exchanges (CoinSquare, CoinBerry) have already subjected themselves to annual audits. However, these results are not presently shared publicly, and there is no guarantee over the process including all user assets or the integrity and independence of the auditor. The auditor has been typically not known, and in some cases, the identity of the auditor is protected by a NDA. Only in one case (BitBuy) was an actual report generated and publicly shared. There has been no attempt made to validate that user accounts provided during these audits have been complete or accurate. A fraudulent fractional exchange, or one which had suffered a breach they were unwilling to publicly accept (see CoinBene), could easily maintain a second set of books for auditors or simply exclude key accounts to pass an individual audit.
The proposed solution would see a reporting standard which includes at a minimum - percentage of backing for each asset relative to account balances and the nature of how those assets are stored, with ownership proven by the auditor. The auditor would also publicly provide a "hash list", which they independently generate from the accounts provided by the exchange. Every exchange user can then check their information against this public "hash list". A hash is a one-way form of encryption, which fully protects the private information, yet allows anyone who knows that information already to validate that it was included. Less experienced users can take advantage of public tools to calculate the hash from their information (provided by the exchange), and thus have certainty that the auditor received their full balance information. Easy instructions can be provided.
Auditors should be impartial, their identities and process public, and they should be rotated so that the same auditor is never used twice in a row. Balancing the cost of auditing against the needs for regular updates, a 6 month cycle likely makes the most sense.

Hot Wallet Management
The best solution for hot wallets is not to use them. CoinBerry reportedly uses multi-sig on all withdrawals, and Bitmex is an international example known for their structure devoid of hot wallets.
However, many platforms and customers desire fast withdrawal processes, and human validation has a cost of time and delay in this process.
A model of self-insurance or separate funds for hot wallets may be used in these cases. Under this model, a platform still has 100% of their client balance in cold storage and holds additional funds in hot wallets for quick withdrawal. Thus, the risk of those hot wallets is 100% on exchange operators and not affecting the exchange users. Since most platforms typically only have 1%-5% in hot wallets at any given time, it shouldn't be unreasonable to build/maintain these additional reserves over time using exchange fees or additional investment. Larger withdrawals would still be handled at regular intervals from the cold storage.
Hot wallet risks have historically posed a large risk and there is no established standard to guarantee secure hot wallets. When the government of South Korea dispatched security inspections to multiple exchanges, the results were still that 3 of them got hacked after the inspections. If standards develop such that an organization in the market is willing to insure the hot wallets, this could provide an acceptable alternative. Another option may be for multiple exchange operators to pool funds aside for a hot wallet insurance fund. Comprehensive coverage standards must be established and maintained for all hot wallet balances to make sure Canadians are adequately protected.

Current Draft Proposal

(1) Proper multi-signature cold wallet storage.
(a) Each private key is the personal and legal responsibility of one person - the “signatory”. Signatories have special rights and responsibilities to protect user assets. Signatories are trained and certified through a course covering (1) past hacking and fraud cases, (2) proper and secure key generation, and (3) proper safekeeping of private keys. All private keys must be generated and stored 100% offline by the signatory. If even one private keys is ever breached or suspected to be breached, the wallet must be regenerated and all funds relocated to a new wallet.
(b) All signatories must be separate background-checked individuals free of past criminal conviction. Canadians should have a right to know who holds their funds. All signing of transactions must take place with all signatories on Canadian soil or on the soil of a country with a solid legal system which agrees to uphold and support these rules (from an established white-list of countries which expands over time).
(c) 3-5 independent signatures are required for any withdrawal. There must be 1-3 spare signatories, and a maximum of 7 total signatories. The following are all valid combinations: 3of4, 3of5, 3of6, 4of5, 4of6, 4of7, 5of6, or 5of7.
(d) A security audit should be conducted to validate the cold wallet is set up correctly and provide any additional pertinent information. The primary purpose is to ensure that all signatories are acting independently and using best practices for private key storage. A report summarizing all steps taken and who did the audit will be made public. Canadians must be able to validate the right measures are in place to protect their funds.
(e) There is a simple approval process if signatories wish to visit any country outside Canada, with a potential whitelist of exempt countries. At most 2 signatories can be outside of aligned jurisdiction at any given time. All exchanges would be required to keep a compliant cold wallet for Canadian funds and have a Canadian office if they wish to serve Canadian customers.
(2) Regular and transparent solvency audits.
(a) An audit must be conducted at founding, after 3 months of operation, and at least once every 6 months to compare customer balances against all stored cryptocurrency and fiat balances. The auditor must be known, independent, and never the same twice in a row.
(b) An audit report will be published featuring the steps conducted in a readable format. This should be made available to all Canadians on the exchange website and on a government website. The report must include what percentage of each customer asset is backed on the exchange, and how those funds are stored.
(c) The auditor will independently produce a hash of each customer's identifying information and balance as they perform the audit. This will be made publicly available on the exchange and government website, along with simplified instructions that each customer can use to verify that their balance was included in the audit process.
(d) The audit needs to include a proof of ownership for any cryptocurrency wallets included. A satoshi test (spending a small amount) or partially signed transaction both qualify.
(e) Any platform without 100% reserves should be assessed on a regular basis by a government or industry watchdog. This entity should work to prevent any further drop, support any private investor to come in, or facilitate a merger so that 100% backing can be obtained as soon as possible.
(3) Protections for hot wallets and transactions.
(a) A standardized list of approved coins and procedures will be established to constitute valid cold storage wallets. Where a multi-sig process is not natively available, efforts will be undertaken to establish a suitable and stable smart contract standard. This list will be expanded and improved over time. Coins and procedures not on the list are considered hot wallets.
(b) Hot wallets can be backed by additional funds in cold storage or an acceptable third-party insurance provider with a comprehensive coverage policy.
(c) Exchanges are required to cover the full balance of all user funds as denominated in the same currency, or double the balance as denominated in bitcoin or CAD using an established trading rate. If the balance is ever insufficient due to market movements, the firm must rectify this within 24 hours by moving assets to cold storage or increasing insurance coverage.
(d) Any large transactions (above a set threshold) from cold storage to any new wallet addresses (not previously transacted with) must be tested with a smaller transaction first. Deposits of cryptocurrency must be limited to prevent economic 51% attacks. Any issues are to be covered by the exchange.
(e) Exchange platforms must provide suitable authentication for users, including making available approved forms of two-factor authentication. SMS-based authentication is not to be supported. Withdrawals must be blocked for 48 hours in the event of any account password change. Disputes on the negligence of exchanges should be governed by case law.

Steps Forward

Continued review of existing OSC feedback is still underway. More feedback and opinions on the framework and ideas as presented here are extremely valuable. The above is a draft and not finalized.
The process of further developing and bringing a suitable framework to protect Canadians will require the support of exchange operators, legal experts, and many others in the community. The costs of not doing such are tremendous. A large and convoluted framework, one based on flawed ideas or implementation, or one which fails to properly safeguard Canadians is not just extremely expensive and risky for all Canadians, severely limiting to the credibility and reputation of the industry, but an existential risk to many exchanges.
The responsibility falls to all of us to provide our insight and make our opinions heard on this critical matter. Please take the time to give your thoughts.
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Interview With Eddie Jiang: How CoinEx Is Adapting To The Exchange Space And Growing

Interview With Eddie Jiang: How CoinEx Is Adapting To The Exchange Space And Growing
Written by chaintalk.tv
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We recently had the opportunity to interview the VP of ViaBTC Group, Eddie Jiang. ViaBTC Group owns popular crypto exchange CoinEx and ViaBTC Pool. In this interview Eddie discusses being the first exchange to use BCH as the base currency, ViaBTC Pool and integrating with CoinEx, new features and ambassador program, and competing with other exchanges like Binance and Huobi. Please enjoy the interview below.
How come you decided to open up CoinEx to other cryptos other than just BCH?
Eddie Jiang: CoinEx is the world’s first exchange to implement Bitcoin Cash as a base currency. At that time, it was evident that there was a demand for BCH trading markets, and we are the first to explore this opportunity. It also shows our determination to support the BCH’s development.
As CoinEx is developing, our goal becomes bigger and we are aiming at the global market. We need to constantly improve our product diversification to meet the different needs of more users, so we open up to other cryptos. In the past six months, we have listed more than 50 new tokens. Up to now, we have listed 129 cryptos and 313 markets. Besides, in addition to spot trading, CoinEx also supports perpetual contract and other derivatives trading.
How does CoinEx integrate with the ViaBTC Pool?
Eddie Jiang: ViaBTC Group announced a strategic upgrade, which included a new organizational structure, product innovations and service improvements, on 30 May.
As part of the change, the Group has established three dedicated business units (BU): the financial services BU, consisting of ViaBTC mining pool and CoinEx exchange; the infrastructure services BU, including ViaWallet and Blockchain Explorer; and the ecological development BU, focusing on the research and development of public chain technology and the construction of the ecology.
After halving, the combination of mining and finance will become closer and closer. Investing in mining machines is like buying a Bitcoin option. Miners need more flexible financial products to maintain and increase the value of assets, or hedging services. Based on this judgment, the operations of ViaBTC mining pool and CoinEx exchange will be integrated in the future to realize the financial empowerment of the mining pool to meet the diverse financial needs of miners.
Features of this integrated product upgrade can be summarized as: “ The mining pool is the wallet, and the wallet is the transaction.” ViaBTC is the world first mining pool that has a wallet embedded in the mining pool account. Users do not need to transfer the mined coins, and can realize the function of coin exchange within the wallet. For example, they can directly convert the mined coins into USDT to pay electricity bill. What’s more, users can store, deposit and withdraw their revenue, and transfer assets to CoinEx at any time without charge, as well as complete other operations on the exchange, such as purchasing wealth management products for asset preservation and appreciation. In addition, we also provide hedging services. All of the above functions can be completed in one stop in the mining pool, without the need to transfer assets between different platforms.
The exchange empowers the mining pool, and the mining pool will further bring more traffic and resources to the exchange. The two complement each other and development coordinately.
CoinEx has recently added many new features. Can you talk about what new updates were made to the platform and why you made them?
Eddie Jiang: We have always attached great importance to the development of overseas markets since our establishment, and one of our major goals this year is to cover at least 10 different languages speaking markets.
To realize this and to meet the needs of more users worldwide, CoinEx has been continuously optimizing and upgrading its operating strategies, products and services. Our product diversifications are constantly improving. As I said before, we have launched leverage trading, perpetual contract trading, and wealth management products in addition to just spot trading. However, we don’t ignore the importance of spot trading. More mainstream, popular, and high-quality tokens have been listed, and up to now, there are 129 tokens and 313 trading pairs on CoinEx.
During the epidemic, we have never slowed down our development. Lacking of the OTC service has always been a shortage for CoinEx. In March, we partner with Simplex to integrate the first fiat onramp to our platform. People now can buy crypto with their credit cards, which lowers the threshold for more people to enter the crypto world. Moreover, we announced global strategic partnership with Matrixport to provide people with large amount of fiat to crypto needs the OTC service. These newly launched services also help to attract more users.
At the same time, CoinEx has been launched in Arabic, Italian, English, Japanese, Russian, Korean and other 16 languages. Earlier we also carried out product upgrades, making the UI and function sections clearer.
In terms of operations, we launched an upgraded CoinEx Ambassador program in March. To best utilize each ambassador’s personal strengths, there are four categories of CoinEx Ambassador with different responsibilities, namely Referral Ambassador, Marketing Ambassador, Operation Ambassador, and Business Ambassador, which will expand our brand’s exposure and help CoinEx grow into a more international exchange platform.
From March until now CoinEx has seen a 100% increase in user registrations. Why is that and are you able to see where they are coming from?
Eddie Jiang: Because of the efforts mentioned above, in 2020, we’ve seen an exponential increase in activity in just the past few months alone. In this year alone, CoinEx’s daily registered users increased by 100%. These new users mainly come from markets such as the Middle East, Asia Pacific, and more.
Interestingly, we saw an uptick in traffic from the Middle East in March. User growth in Southeast Asia also picked up significantly, newly registered users increased by 133.6% in April.
With Binance, BitMex, Huobi, Bybit, and Deribit, controlling most of the crypto futures and options markets, where do you see CoinEx fitting in? How do you plan to capture market share from these large exchanges?
Eddie Jiang: We won’t compete with others. We focus on ourselves to improve products and our goal is to be better than yesterday.
Our pace is solid and steady, instead of focusing on temporary heat and flow. We have always attached great importance of spot trading, and we are committed to be responsible for users’ investment. We have set up CoinEx Institution, which is dedicated on project research. A listing committee consist of core team members review and vote on projects recommended by the CoinEx Institution. In this way, fraud projects are avoided as much as possible.
Besides, we will focus on niche areas with great potential. For example, Southeast Asia and the Middle East. CoinEx can serve users in those countries well by providing a platform with rich cryptos to trade, and will pay more efforts on refined operations in different countries.
Moreover, CoinEx has a very complete ecosystem. Financial services, infrastructure, and ecological development, the three business units complement each other. The infrastructure BU is our cornerstone and is positioned as a defensive product; the financial service BU is a cash cow and is positioned as an aggressive product; the ecological development BU focuses on the public chain ecology and is the future infrastructure.
What is the geographical breakdown of the CoinEx userbase?
Eddie Jiang: The current proportion of CoinEx’s overseas users has reached 80% of the total registered users, and mainly in Australia, Southeast Asia, North America, Middle East and South Korea.
Do you have plans to focus on any certain jurisdictions? How will you do that?
Eddie Jiang: When we evaluate regions, two things matter: policy and potential.
Whether an exchange’s business expansion in a region is smooth or not largely depends on the region’s policies. If the region is not very friendly towards cryptocurrency or has repeated attitudes, there will be more difficulties and the cost will be much higher.
For a region’s development potential, we need to think about the demand and market development status. South Korea, Southeast Asia, the Middle East and other regions are all areas with good potential for cryptocurrency development. Compared with Europe and America, policy risks in these countries are lower, and the supervision mechanism is relatively complete. The public has a high degree of awareness of cryptocurrencies. Besides, some regions or countries have inflation problems due to political and economic reasons.
CoinEx will continue to focus on the Middle East and South Asia, which are relatively niche. India has just lifted ban on cryptocurrency trading this year, and there are many cryptocurrency investors in Indian. CoinEx can serve them well by providing a platform with rich cryptos to trade. More people in the Middle East are interested cryptos, especially in countries that are subject to economic sanctions or high inflation. For those people, cryptocurrencies are one of the best choices for asset preservation.
Since the CoinEx Ambassador program launched in March, it has been almost three months. We are conducting the second round of ambassador recruitment. This time, we will use the power of ambassadors to expand our recruitment coverage and strive to attract more crypto enthusiasts from all over the world to grow together with CoinEx. Moreover, we will launch the National Expansion plan and leverage on the CoinEx and ViaBTC mining pool resources, to further explore the Russian market. At the market level, we will make more PR efforts in local markets, and start refined operations.
What is CoinEx Chain and CoinEx DEX?
Eddie Jiang: CoinEx Chain is a public chain built on the Tendermint consensus protocol and the Cosmos SDK. It consists of three dedicated public chains parallel to each other. Among these three chains, CoinEx DEX meets the most basic needs of DeFi for token issuance, transfer, and transactions. The Smart Chain is designed to meet the needs of complex financial scenarios and delivers programmable cash. The Privacy Chain facilitates privacy and security.
On November 11, 2019, we took the lead in launching the Mainnet of CoinEx DEX. CoinEx DEX is the world’s first public chain dedicated to decentralized transactions. Users can easily manage their digital assets on it.
CoinEx DEX can fully satisfy the following conditions: users have private keys at their own disposal; transfers and transactions are all completed on-chain, which is 200% transparent and checkable; the issuance, transfer, and transaction of tokens do not require review or permission; the community governance and operation is decentralized, similar to EOS, and validators are introduced to the community ecosystem construction and governance. There are currently 41 validators.
It also has extreme performance. TPS reaches as high as 10,000 and transactions are confirmed within seconds. The transaction fee, 0.0001 US dollars for each transaction, is negligible.
Third, it’s simple and easy to use. The new operation interface design helps beginners get started quickly; with the one-click token issuing module, users only need to fill in a few items to issue tokens; the built-in automated market-making module guarantees liquidity.
How will CoinEx DEX improve the decentralized exchange space that has been unable to gain much adoption?
Eddie Jiang: There are many challenges and difficulties facing centralized exchanges. The first difficulty is security. Security is a huge concern for CEXs. Over the last 10 years, hackers have stolen more than $1.5 billion from centralized exchanges. In fact, research groups estimate that hackers stole somewhere between $950 Million and $1 Billion from centralized exchanges in 2018 alone. There were also incidents of coin thefts in other exchanges in 2019. Many exchanges, such as Mt. Gox, Youbit, were forced to file for bankruptcy and shut down as a result of hacks.
The second is high management costs. Centralized exchanges need to list a large number of cryptocurrencies and each of them have different trading pairs. That entails huge efforts in development and maintenance and, thus, high management costs.
The last is global policies. Cryptocurrency is faced with different regulatory policies in different countries. Every time a centralized exchange enters a country, it needs to adapt itself to local regulatory policies for compliance. This is a holdback for the exchange’s rapid market expansion globally. Such adaptation will also bring a huge learning cost for the exchange team.
Obviously, these problems can be well solved by DEX. CoinEx DEX is a true DEX with full open source and full community governance, as well as without depending on official nodes, websites, wallets, etc. On DEX, users are able to in charge of their own private keys and assets all by themselves. Their assets are more safe and secure. Transfers and transactions are all completed on-chain, which is 200% transparent and checkable; and the issuance, transfer, and transaction of tokens do not require review or permission. What’s more, CoinEx DEX provides a great and convenient user experience.
How will CoinEx Chain and DEX help the crypto industry as a whole?
Eddie Jiang: The public chain is the cornerstone of the blockchain industry. CoinEx Chain has the parallelism of multiple dedicated public chains, each of which performs its own functions, by cross-chaining for both high performance and flexibility.
CoinEx Chain is committed to building the next generation of blockchain financial infrastructure. It is a more complete ecosystem built around the DEX public chain. The DEX public chain is a dedicated public chain developed specifically for token issuance and trading and the biggest improvement on trading speed, so it only supports the necessary functions, not smart contracts.
But smart contracts are the foundation for building more complex financial applications. Outside the DEX public chain, CoinEx Chain also includes a Smart Chain that supports smart contracts.
Moreover, as privacy issues on the current blockchain have been criticized, it is one of the core tasks of CoinEx Chain to safeguard users’ privacy. Similar to the Smart Chain, the Privacy Chain specifically supports transaction privacy protection. With cross-chain circulation, it can improve the privacy characteristic of the entire CoinEx Chain ecosystem.
Nowadays, 1.7 million people in the world have no bank accounts; however, among them, two thirds are smartphone users with huge demands for financial services. The public chain will empower DeFi applications’ development and popularization, not only help more companies to seize the huge market opportunity, but also to bring lasting transformations and improvements in people’s lives.
With so many crypto exchanges, what is the future outlook of CoinEx when it comes to the crypto exchange space?
Eddie Jiang: It has been nearly 3 years since CoinEx has been launched, but it’s quite young for an entrepreneurial team. We have seen too many projects’ failures due to governance issues. CoinEx has a very elite team with high technical and management capabilities. In terms of business, CoinEx has gradually developed with diversified business and a complete ecosystem. It’s clear that the market will still grow very fast in the future, and the market size is still very large. We will continue to improve our products, put more efforts in marketing and operations, as well as look for more high-quality projects, to increase the number of users and transactions on the platform. Lay a solid foundation, and I’m sure the time will come for us to shine.
What updates is the CoinEx team most excited for?
Eddie Jiang: We are very excited about the National Expansion Plan which will be launched later this year. It is an important part in CoinEx’s globalization strategy. We will actively explore some new markets while consolidate the original ones. CoinEx will set aside 10 million US dollars to set up a “Pioneer Fund” to support this plan. This fund will be used to support local cryptocurrency projects and promote the development of the local cryptocurrency communities through investment or cooperation. Our goal this year is to invest in projects and communities that are conducive to expanding the CoinEx ecosystem in countries with high development potential.
Original article
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Binance Hacked - What You Need to Know About Holding Your Cryptocurrencies on Centralized Exchanges Binance Hacked  How much was stolen & what can we learn from this? Binance Has 7,000 BTC Stolen From Hot Wallet Bitcoin Q&A: Binance hack, chain roll-back? Binance HACKED - Bitcoin Rally Stalled How To Buy, Sell and Deposit Bitcoin to Binance ( Binance Tutorial) 34 Bitcoin Hacked/Stolen  Binance Phishing Website  How To Protect Yourself? - Be Safe!!!

Binance traced the cryptocurrency theft — more than 7,000 bitcoins at the time of writing — to a single wallet after the hackers stole the contents of the company’s bitcoin hot wallet ... Maybe you want to buy bitcoin with a stolen credit card or debit card, I will be explaining the new and working method to cash out cc using coinbase. To be successful, you have to follow all the instructions specified in this tutorial. Don’t be in a hurry to try it out, relax and get all the information you need. Warning! You are responsible for anything you do with the knowledge gotten from ... Encrypting your Bitcoin wallet with a strong password, containing 15+ characters, including upper and lower case letterts, numbers, and symbols, will make it difficult for the hacker to use the stolen wallet.dat. Unfortunately, if the virus is also a keylogger, and has logged you typing in your encryption password, then they can still open the wallet. The Binance exchange, which stores Bitcoin and other crypto-currencies for members, said hackers took 7,000 bitcoins in one go. Withdrawals have now been suspended on the platform. Binance said the theft occurred from the company's so-called "hot wallet," which accounts for about 2% of its total bitcoin holdings. A wallet is a digital means of storing cryptocurrency. A "hot ... Binance immediately halted all withdrawals from their system. It’s important to note that this hack only impacts Binanace’s Bitcoin hot wallet, which represents roughly 2% of their total Bitcoin holdings. The other 98% of their Bitcoin holdings are in various other wallets and are not affected. How Did the Binance Hack Happen? Source: Chainalysis "Visualization of the $40M USD stolen from Binance" The Twitter-based monitoring channel Whale Alert reported movement of over 700 BTC from one of the hacker wallet addressed to two other wallets. The first transaction that Whale Alert reported was for 707.1 BTC, and the second with only 1 BTC. The overall value of the two transactions is just about $8 million (current BTC ... Cybercrime gangs have stolen over to $22 million from users who use the Electrum Bitcoin wallets via a fake app update scam according to an investigation. The criminals later transferred the stolen funds to multiple Bitcoin accounts which now contain 1,980 bitcoin. Much of these funds were stolen in one single incident in August, after […] I had heard about Bitcoin, but it was one of those technologies where I nodded my head sagely whenever I was in the same room with those talking about it. As for investing or speculating, I had ... However, there’s an ongoing Bitcoin wallet hack that regulators can’t do a darn thing about that has since stolen a total of $22 million in BTC and the number climbs with each passing day and unsuspecting user. Here’s what the hack entails, how to avoid it, and why it’s been so successful at stealing cryptocurrency for so long.

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Binance Hacked - What You Need to Know About Holding Your Cryptocurrencies on Centralized Exchanges

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